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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARIANI AIR PRODUCTS 
COMPANY, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
GILL'S TIRE MARKET, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case 
No. 
12992 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This case was tried to the Court before the Hon-
orable Stewart M. Hanson and involves a claim by 
plaintiff against defendant for unpaid rent. Defend-
ant's answer was that the premises had been 
repossessed by plaintiff, that the repossession was not 
objected to by defendant but effectively terminated 
the lease and obligation of defendant to pay rent. 
Defendant also defended upon the ground that the 
plaintiff violated the lease agreement in failing to 
keep the roof in a reasonable state of repair, permit-
ting the premises to become uninhabitable as a result 
of roof leakage into the retail section of the store. 
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Following trial, Court entered judgment against the 
defendant, rejecting its defenses, and ordered rent to 
be paid for the full lease term, with judgment in the 
amount of $1,800.00 together with attorney's fees in 
the amount of $+68.33. 
From this judgment the defendant prosecuted 
its appeal. 
DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT 
Judgment ordered in favor of plaintiff and 
against defendant follovving trial in the amount of 
$1,800.00 back rent, $468.33 attorney's fees, and 
$+5.50 costs were entered by the Trial Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the Trial Court 
judgment upon the ground and for the reason that 
as a matter of law on the uncontradicted evidence no 
rent was O\ving by defendant and no attorney's fees 
\Vere proper. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The agreement between the parties is in writing 
and is Exhibit 1-P, a lease dated the 16th day of 
l\1arch, 19 7 0. 
It covers the premises located at 6+8 South First 
\Vest in Salt Lake City, Utah, and provided for rent 
at the rate of $300.00 per month. 
The lease anticipated the operation on the 
premises by the lessee of a tire business and \vas 
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actually used for wholesale and retail operations dur-
ing the time when the premises were fully used. 
The provision of the lease which, it is defendant's 
claim, was violated by plaintiff is the replacement 
paragraph for paragraph 4 in writing and attached 
to the lease which provides as follows: 
"Lessor agrees to maintain the roof of the 
building located on said premises during the 
term of this lease, except for any repairs as 
may be required as a result of improvements 
ocr remodeling of said premises by Lessee or 
damage to the roof resulting from the acts 
and conduct of Lessee or others in connection 
with Lessee's occupancy of the premises." 
See Exhibit 1-P attachment. 
On the roof of the premises, the Lessor had 
installed a swamp cooler prior to the time of the 
lease. Exhibit 10-P shows the swamp cooler sitting 
on the roof of the building. 
Prior to the 28th of January, defendant's em-
ployees discovered that there was a leak in the roof 
and water had run down on the inside of the building 
and had caused substantial damage to the section 
occupied by defendant for its retail outlet. (R. page 
40) On January 28, 1971 the manager of plaintiff 
and an employee of defendant met on the premises 
and examined the damage done by the leak in the 
roof. Witnesses Alvey for defendant and Mohr for 
plaintiff both agree that as a result of said conference 
Mohr, representing plaintiff, agreed to repair the 
roof and to do the repairs necessary to replace the 
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damaged wallpaper and paint in the room used by 
defendant for a retail outlet. This basic understand-
ing is shown by the testimony of Mohr, pages 40 
through 42 of the record. Attempts were made by 
plaintiff to do the repair work on occasions when the 
premises were not open for business and after hours, 
but Alvey, representing defendant, would not permit 
this since there was valuable tires stored on the 
premises and security could not be maintained if 
after hours work was accomplished CR. 42). No 
repair work was ever done by the plaintiff other than 
the leak in the roof was repaired and the water which 
apparently was leaking from the swamp cooler down 
through the roof was stopped. When the premises 
were re-rented, plaintiff then allowed the new tenant 
$700.00 against the cost of repairing the area dam-
aged by the water. CR.43). 
It appeared clear that the water leaked out of the 
swamp cooler on to the roof of the building, and then 
through the roof of the building into the area occupied 
by defendant CR. 47, R. 50, R. 93). Defendant's testi-
mony, which is uncontradicted, from witness Alvey 
was that the damage to the interior of the building 
from the leak through the roof made the sales office 
unusable CR. 52). After the discussion with Mohr, 
manager of plaintiff, defendant did not attempt to 
make the repairs but waited for these to be accom-
plished by plaintiff's organization CR. 52). The only 
attempt to do the repairs was to arrange for after 
hour workers to be in the premises, which the defend-
ant could not permit since security could not be main-
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tained (R. 53). Jay Gill, president 0£ defendant, 
described the damage done and testified that the dam-
age was so extensive that the area could not be used 
as a retail tire outlet (R. 57). This testimony by 
defendant's witnesses was uncontradicted, as was the 
testimony that $700.00 was the reasonable appraisal 
for the damages allowed by plaintiff. 
It was stipulated by counsel for the parties that 
defendant had paid 12 months rent which would 
be through the month of March, 1971, and that six 
months rent would be all that could be claimed for 
the period of April, 1971 through September, 1971. 
( R. 31 ) . The following facts are established, defend-
ant believes, as uncontradicted and undisputed. 
( 1) That the plaintiff retained the responsibility for 
repairing the roof of the premises; (2) That the roof 
leaked and caused damage to the interior of the 
premises in December or early January of 1970 and 
1971; (3) That the plaintiff ascertained the damage 
and agreed to repair the roof and the damage done 
to the interior of the building; (4) That the roof was 
not repaired nor the damage repaired to the interior 
of the building at any time while the defendant's 
lease was in effect; ( 5) That the cost of repair was 
$700.00; (6) That the damage made the premises 
uninhabitable for a retail sales outlet; ( 7) On April 
28, 1971 Mariani, owner of plaintiff, picked up the 
key to the premises from Gill, owner of defendant, 
and retained the key from that time on, which was 
defendant's only means of access to the inside of the 
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building CR. 85, R. 78); (8) No use was made of the 
building by defendant after April 28, 1971. 
Plaintiff testified that repeated efforts were made 
to contact Gill and promises were made to return 
the key to him, but neither one of these events occur-
red following the visit on April 28, 1971 by Mariani 
and Gill to the premises, at which time Mariani 
picked up Gill's key to the building. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE LEASE TERMI-
NATED ON APRIL 28, 1971. 
It is defendant's position, based on the uncontra-
dicted evidence and the undisputed stipulations and 
agreement as to what had occurred, that effective the 
28th of April, 1971 defendant no longer owed rent 
to the plaintiff and plaintiff had repossessed and taken 
back the property which had been theretofore under 
lease to defendant. 
The uncontradicted evidence is that Mariani 
picked up the key, which was the only means of 
access that defendant had to the premises, on April 
28 and retained it from that time on. He testified he 
made efforts to return the key but was never 
successful. 
The conduct of the parties as far as it relates to 
the interpretation of a contract has universely been 
held to be the highest evidence of their intentions. 
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This Court, in Hodges Irrigation Co. v. Swan Creek 
Canal Co,., 111Utah405,181 P.2d217,recitedand 
followed this universal rule. Where a party, by his 
conduct, interprets the contract and the other party 
relies on the interpretation, the real meaning of the 
agreement is found. 
Here there was independent practical construc-
tion by Mariani, accepted by Gill. The act of taking 
the key was intentionally and conclusively engaged 
in by Mariani and accepted by Gill. 
Gill made no attempt to return to possession or 
repair the premises. The correspondence between the 
attorneys for Mariani and Gill shows that the key to 
the premises was a matter that all knew was impor-
tant. Gill's testimony is not contradicted where he 
testified that if the key was returned and the premises 
fixed up so that they could be habitable, he would pay 
the rent. Neither one of these conditions was ever 
met. 
In Hodges Irrigation Co. v. Swan Creek Canal 
Co., supra, this Court stated the rule which defendant 
asserts is applicable: 
"Here appellant from the time of the removal 
of the flume controverted respondent's inter-
pretation. True there were some acceptances 
by some of appellant's secretaries of the $6 
proferred by respondent in its settlement of 
accounts but such acceptances are just as con-
sistent with the theory that since respondent 
refused to pay more they took what they 
could get as it is with the contention that 
appellant interpreted the contract in the same 
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manner as respondent, and in view of the fact 
that appellant has since the removal of the 
flume tried to get respondent to pay an equal 
share of the expenses incurred, it is probable 
that the reason of such acceptances of the $6 
was inability to collect more rather than an 
indication of a practical interpretation of the 
contract. As stated in 17 C.J .S., Contracts, 
Sec. 325, subdiv. b, page 764: 
'To warrant the court in according great 
weight to, or adopting, a practical con-
struction by the parties, it is necessary 
and sufficient that each party shall have 
placed the same construction on the con-
tract. While the construction placed by 
one party on his own intention, the mean-
ing of the contract cannot be established 
by the construction placed on it by one of 
the parties, unless such interpretation has 
been made to and relied on by the other 
party, or has been known to and 
acquiesced in by the other party, * * *.' " 
The Tenth Circuit has also expressed itself on the 
rule of contract interpretation in Broadhurst v. 
Whitelock, 313 F. 2d 130 CC.A. Utah), it stated, 
page 316: 
"This contract was drafted by one of the parties 
and changed by the other; the trial court 
sought out the intent from the particular 
wording, from the whole document, from the 
general circumstances, and from the acts of 
the parties." 
* * * * * * * * * 
"Thus the action of the parties and their associ-
ates in the handling of the claims served to 
place an interpretation on the agreements by 
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the parties, and this interpretation is con-
sistent with the trial court's findings and 
conclusions.'' 
Defendant respectfully submits that the conduct 
of Mariani conclusively shows that he did not intend 
to fix up the premises so they would be habitable. The 
premises were not fixed up. Gill could not use the 
building in the way that it wished. Mariani's con-
duct, it is defendant's position, is, as a matter of law, 
a termination of the lease on April 28, 1971. No rent 
thereafter would be due and owing and the judgment 
of the Court should have been for one month's rent 
only for the period ending April 28, 1971, a sum of 
$300.00. 
POINT II 
MARIANI WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RENT 
UNTIL THE ROOF LEAK AND DAMAGE 
CAUSED BY IT WERE REPAIRED. 
It is uncontradicted in all of the evidence that 
the premises leased to Gill were damaged through a 
leak in the roof CR. 47-50-93). 
It is uncontradicted that plaintiff accepted the 
responsibility for repairing the roof and the damage 
which the leak had caused to the interior of the build-
ing CR. 42). 
It is further uncontradicted that the damage to 
the retail area in the building made it unfit for use 
by defendant. Defendant, however, continued to pay 
the rent up through the month of March, and it is 
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stated in the letter from Attorney Fullmer, first failed 
to pay additional rent April 20, 1971. 
It has always been the rule of law that where 
a tenant is deprived of the use of the premises by the 
failure of the landlord to repair, the tenant is entitled 
to recover the rent paid for the period in question or 
to offset it against the balance of the rent owing. See 
Timmons v. McKenzie, 21 Ariz. 433, 189 P. 627; 
Mayer v. Rothstein, 167 N.Y.S. 503; 36 Corpus Juris, 
P. 167, Section 801, Note 15-16; 51 C.J.S., P. 997, 
Section 373 (5), Note 43. 
Perhaps the best and most succinct exposition 
of the law is in Mitchell v. Weiss, Texas C.A., 26 S.W. 
2d 699. There the Court stated the rule in the follow-
ing language: 
"The proper measure of damages varies with 
the facts of the particular case. In some cases 
it is regarded that the tenant, being in pos-
session, should make the repairs when the 
landlord fails to do so, and the measure of 
damages in such a case is the reasonable cost 
of the repairs. 1 Sedgwick on Damages (9th 
Ed.) Sec. 209. 
The usual measure applied is the reduced 
rental value; that is, the difference between 
the contract rental and the rental value in the 
unrepaired condition. 35 C.J. 1191. 
The present case is not one where the 
landlord has wholly breached his covenant 
to repair. At most the breach is but partial by 
failing to restore one of the buildings to as 
good condition as it was just before the fire. 
The tenant has not been disturbed in his 
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possession of the buildings except in one of 
them, and then only during the brief period 
the repairs were being made. This interrup-
tion was of course authorized. The proper 
measure of the tenant's damage in this case 
is the reduced rental value, if any, as indi-
cated above." 
In a case somewhat similar in legal significance 
to the case at bar, Bostwich v. Losey, 67 Mich. 554, 
35 NW 246, the Michigan Supreme Court set down 
the rule which the defendant seeks to have this Court 
apply, namely that there is no rent due and owing 
after failure of the plaintiff to make the repairs which 
it covenanted to make and after failure to put the 
premises back in a usable and habitable condition. 
See 248 NW Rept. 
"What the defendants contracted for was the 
use of the saw-mill, and the saw-mill was 
dependent in its use upon the water-power 
which propelled it. The plaintiff covenanted 
to keep the flumes, through which the water 
passed to the mill, in repair. If he neglected 
or refused to do this when notified, and on 
account of such neglect the water-power was 
destroyed, and the mill thereby rendered use-
less to the defendants, the consideration of 
the agreement or lease failed, and the defend-
ants were justified in abandoning the 
premises, and the stipulated rent could not 
be recovered after such failure of considera-
tion. Tyler v. Disbrow, 40 Mich. 415; Landi. 
& Ten. Sec. 377; Hinckley v. Beckwith, 13 
Wis. 34. Nor were the defendants bound to 
make the repairs themselves. It was the duty 
of plaintiff, under the agreement, to make 
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these repairs, without which the premises 
were of but little or no value for the use 
defendants required, and to which they were 
entitled under the contract. The defendants 
had the right to hold the plaintiff to the 
ordinary responsibility of a party failing to 
perform his agreement, to-wit, to pay the 
damages caused by such failure. We can see 
no difference in this respect between this and 
any other contract. Hinckley v. Beckwith, 13 
Wis. 31, 17 Wis. 426; Myers v. Burns, 35 N.Y. 
269; Hexter v. Knox, 63 N.Y. 561. 
The conduct of the parties, defendant submits, 
is most important and conclusive on the Court in 
interpreting the meaning and responsibilities that 
each party undertook. 
Plaintiff never did, even after it obtained the 
key and had free access to the building, repair the 
damage which had been caused by the leak in the 
roof. It never did place the premises back in a usable 
and habitable condition for the purposes which 
defendanted rented. No work was ever done to 
restore the premises by plaintiff. When it entered 
into an agreement to release them, it gave to the new 
tenant a $700.00 consideration and permitted the 
new tenant to make the repairs that were necessary 
to place the premises in a habitable condition. (R. 42, 
testimony of Mohr, manager of plaintiff). 
The position of defendant is not based on contra-
dictory evidence as the evidence was relatively free 
of conflict on the crucial issues which defendant sub-
mits are determinative of the parties' rights. It is 
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respectfully submitted as a matter of law that the 
Trial Court erred in granting judgment against the 
defendant for the rent for the whole term, including 
attorney's fees, and that this Court should reverse · 
the Trial Court since the evidence is undisputed and 
order judgment in accordance with the legal rights of 
the parties as determined by the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of 
the Trial Court should be reversed and that this Court 
should determine the rights of the parties and order 
judgment entered in accordance with the law and as 
it pertains to landlord and tenant. 
Respectfully submitted this -------------------- day of 
·-··-·--------------------------, 1972. 
DWIGHT L. KING 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
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